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Abstract
There are a number of vectors for attack when trying to link an individ-
ual to a certain DNA sequence. Phenotypic prediction is one such vector;
linking DNA to an individual based on their traits. Current approaches
are not overly effective, due to a number of real world considerations.
This report will improve upon current phenotypic prediction, and suggest
a number of methods for defending against such an attack.
1 Introduction
Human DNA is the ultimate key. Linked from a human from birth till death;
it is no wonder that getting hold of such a relationship might be of paramount
importance to many adversarial actors.
The reason that protection of this intrinsic information is so important, is
that we are so careless about passing it around. Every place we go, every
object we touch, we leave a multitude of copies. It would be an impossible task
to hand this key to only those we deem worthy. Instead, striving to control
the link between nucleotide and human, results in the most tractable privacy
strategy.
Part of the problem with this form of defence is the value of DNA informa-
tion. Altruistic parties can use such information to further improve the human
condition. Hiding genetic code could result in a reduction in research speed,
and a balance must be struck between saving lives, and respecting privacy.
Already, organisations like the Personal Genome Project (PGP), OpenSNP,
and 23andMe curate vast databases of human genomes. OpenSNP alone has
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800,000 genetic profiles [1]. When submission occurs to any such database,
participants are assured that their data is stored in an anonymised state. Prac-
tically, this entails not storing raw code with certain pieces of metadata (name
and address), which in America would be in breach of the Health Information
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [2]. What this does not account
for, is that over 60% of individuals can be identified on their ZIP code, date of
birth, and sex alone [2].
This article will initially look at one type of DNA de-anonymisation attack –
phenotypic prediction. This attack will be discussed in the context of real world
use, and then compared with a number of other methods of DNA infiltration.
These attacks will then be discussed in concert to determine the threat they
pose as a joint vector, before countermeasures are discussed and evaluated.
This will include the inclusion of a new countermeasure: phenotypic salt, known
colloquially, as the red-hairring.
1.1 Briefly, biology
A general understanding of DNA, and its variation is required for a proper
understanding of the topic. This section will attempt to distill human genetics
into a few short paragraphs, and can be ignored by any reader well versed in
the topic.
DNA – from a computer scientist’s perspective – is a character string in a
base-4 alphabet (ATCG). The string – like binary – is a set of encoded functions
for a machine (a human) to perform higher order functions. DNA, made up of
nucleotides, encodes the information to build amino acids. These in turn, link
together to encode proteins.
It is at this level that we can begin to think of DNA indirectly producing
macro level functions. For instance, keratin is the structural protein of hair and
fingernails, amongst other things.
The reason two individuals might differ in some aspect, is due to changes in
approximately 0.5% of the genome. Physical traits (phenotypes), differ because
the proteins encoding them are functionally different. Blue eyes occur due to a
lack of the protein melanin [3], which means that the gene encoding melanin is
not functioning correctly. This is likely due to a mutation in the DNA sequence
itself.
It is these mutations that are often the focus in both identification and
research. In the 1990s, microsatellites were used to identify persons involved in
2
criminal cases, as well as otherwise unidentifiable bodies in disaster relief efforts
and to determine familial relationships [3].
The specific type of microsatellite, known as a short tandem repeat (STR),
is a DNA sequence between 2 and 13 nucleotides long, which repeats numer-
ous times. The repeat number is highly variable between individuals and can
therefore be used as an identifying marker.
ATTGCATTGCATTGCATTGCATTGCATTGC (1)
Equation 1 is an example of a fictional STR as it is the sequence ATTGC
repeated six times. Part of the problem with using STRs is the amount of se-
quence required. In a criminal setting, DNA samples size can become restrictive
to certain types of analysis. To combat this, single nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs) can be used instead.
A SNP is a single change in a DNA sequence, which differs from individual
to individual. This is one way in which we get differing physical traits. SNP
mutations result in different sequences – known as alleles – which give rise to
differing phenotypes.
ATCTTAGTCGGCGATGCAG
ATCTTAGTCGTCGATGCAG
(2)
The example shown in Equation 2 shows that far less information is required
to use SNPs for identification compared to STRs. In fact, it has been proven
numerous times that significantly less DNA is required when using SNP identi-
fication methods. [3].
The final useful property of SNP is its relationship to the phenotype of an
individual. In the case of eye colour, a single SNP (rs12913832 in the HERC2
gene), can predict an individuals eye colour, with 88% accuracy [3].
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2 Outline of phenotypic prediction
In [1], SNPs from DNA sequences, are used to predict phenotypic traits. In
essence this results in the identification of an individual from their supposedly
anonymous DNA sequence.
Genotypic information can be gathered from a number of sources. Even
without relying on a large scale data breach, over 800,000 individual genomes
are available on OpenSNP. Phenotypic information is somewhat more difficult
to access, [1] suggests that the prevalence of open social networks allows for
an adversary to gather large amounts of information, both anonymously and
legally.
Using legal data sources broadens the adversarial profile dramatically. With-
out specific legal protections on this action, it is entirely possible that a number
of legal, but ethically questionable, scenarios can occur:
• Corporations can use such an approach to link employees to their genetic
profiles, furthering their ability to discriminate on a number of grounds.
While this is illegal, it can be difficult to prove.
• Insurance companies can use a similar approach as outlined above, with
respect to their customers. What makes this adversary different is in
the case of health insurance, the company likely has a large amount of
physical trait information that it can draw from. This removes the difficult
manual step of combing through social networks to gather the necessary
information.
• One attack that may seem even altruistic, is the case where a researcher
attempts to reach out to a person on the basis of their genetic information.
Perhaps to forewarn of some predisposition to a disease.
The final chunk of data is a relational database that connects SNPs to specific
traits. This can be done as an unsupervised approach, using pre-existing rela-
tional databases, or as a supervised approach, which uses the collected data to
build a statistical model.
Once the requisite data has been collected, [1] outlines two possible attacks
that could result in the de-anonymisation of a single person, or of a large group
of people.
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2.1 Identification attack
maxP (px|gj) (3)
The identification attack (Equation 3), maximizes the probability that some
phenotype px is caused by a genotype gj ; this results in linking the individual
to a particular genotype. From a technical perspective, each genotype gi is
ranked based on the likelihood that it is the genotype of px. This is done by
combining the probabilities each SNP in gj is related to some trait in px. This
is a computationally a very simple problem, and can be done on almost any
computer.
The major downside to this attack is that it only identifies a single individual.
A second proposed attack, perfect matching, attempts to deal with this problem.
2.2 Perfect matching attack
max
∏
P (px|gj) (4)
Perfect matching (Equation 4), attempts to maximize the match between a set
of phenotypes [P ], to a set of genotypes [G]. This means that the problem
increases in complexity, as every gi ∈ [G] must be ranked for every pi ∈ [P ].
Computationally, the problem is known as perfect matching on a weighted
bipartite graph, where every phenotype is joined to every genotype by an edge.
These edges are weighted based on the likelihood the genotype is related to the
phenotype. The sum of these weights is then maximized to produce the most
likely pairings.
2.3 Results
Table 1: Percentage of matches in identification and perfect matching attacks
using differing database sizes. In the unsupervised case, all data was used in
the training and testing sets, as there was not sufficient data to build separate
groups.
Database size = 80 Database size = 10
Unsupervised Supervised Unsupervised Supervised
Identification 5% 13% 44% 52%
Perfect Matching 8% 16% 58% 65%
The results of phenotypic prediction highlight its effectiveness on small datasets,
such as those gathered from a single room of people. Table 1 also eludes to
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the fact a statistical machine learning approach might be more effective than
expertly curated databases.
3 Criticisms of the current approach
While it is important to note [1] was a good first step, it does not provide the
scope for a complete analysis of the attack This is mostly due to the small size
of databases when compared with a realistic database (800,000). This is noted
in the paper, as a suggested as an improvement for further work.
Even with the small datasets, it is still possible to question two assump-
tions made, in an attempt to produce a more realistic picture of a phenotypic
prediction.
3.1 Robustness
One problem with the attack in its current form is its accuracy. Table 1 clearly
shows that the current method in no way guarantees that an attack on an
individual, or a group will be particularly successful. This is not a criticism of
the attack, but of the current level of knowledge upon which the attack relies.
As knowledge of the relationships between SNPs and traits improves, so will
the attack. Interestingly, the fact that the supervised approach did so well,
suggests that as these attacks become more successful, they can train on the
newly cracked data. Thus iteratively improving the accuracy of such an attack.
However, this relies on the fact that the supervised case being better is not just
an artifact of using the same data for both training and testing sets [1].
3.2 Information access
When discussing the collation of information, the complexity of the task is often
ignored. The inclusion of errors in any dataset, can dramatically alter the final
result.
Errors in the phenotype dataset are likely to the result of human error in
the gathering process. Information from social networks has no true guarantee
of accuracy, and therefore could contain incorrect training information (e.g. if
someone had dyed their hair).
Similarly, sequencing errors can occur in genomes. While these are painstak-
ingly removed in the bioinformatics process, it is entirely possible they end up
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in the final sequencing data, and if they are in a SNP region of interest, it can
be impossible to tell. The only noticeable change would be in the likelihood of
the results at the end of the process.
While both phenotype and genotype errors can be ignored if they are believed
to be wrong, it means reducing the number of SNPs evaluated. Removing an
SNP from analysis often makes it impossible to rely on the related trait; which
means reducing the number of traits from 8 to 7. This is a 12.5% reduction
in the statistical power of the model, and may well result in mislabeling an
individual.
Errors in the SNP to phenotype database are even worse, since they result in
whole groups of people being mislabeled. Since the supervised approach avoids
this type of error, is more powerful.
4 Other types of attack
Phenotype prediction is a single type of identity tracing attack. Before dis-
cussing how to combine phenotypic prediction with other forms of attack, a
quick taxonomic overview should be provided [4].
4.1 Identity tracing attacks
Quasi-identifying information (such as gender, ZIP, and date of birth) can be
used to identify a particular genome. As stated before, the combination of
gender, ZIP and date of birth correctly identifies over 60% of individuals.
While there are laws to protect against this form of attack (by reducing the
amount of metadata that can be held in a medical database), extensive public
search databases allow adversaries to link metadata to particular individuals [5].
Genetic genealogy is another vector for identity tracing, this is because sur-
names are often passed paternally, as are Y-chromosomes [2]. By using Y-STRs
it is possible to identify 10-14% of white American males [4], using publicly
available genealogical databases.
Side channel leaks attack the databases of genetic information. In the case
of the PGP, files downloaded from the database containing genetic information
contained full names, once unzipped [4]. Additionally, the generation database
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accession numbers from identifying metadata can be attacked if the algorithm
for generation is cracked.
The final type of identity tracing attack is by using pedigree charts. If
familial relationships can be inferred, then any already identified genomes can be
placed within this structure, reducing the search space for remaining members.
4.2 Attribute disclosure attacks
Since DNA is reasonably prevalent in the environment, it is often entirely pos-
sible to appropriate a sample from a victim, and then use the results from a
Genome Wide Association Study (GWAS), to confirm they are in control of the
correct sample.
To avoid this, a number of health agencies have added access control to
genomes in GWAS studies. However, summary statistics remain publicly acces-
sible. These summary statistics are often information rich enough for the same
attack to be performed [4].
4.3 Completion attacks
Completion attacks use already de-anonymised DNA to infer information about
an anonymous genome based on genotype imputation. This is possible because
relatives may have self-identified public genomes, while the target does not.
Since relatives share many markers with the target, it’s entirely possible to
infer large amounts of information.
This type of attack has been used successfully – and legally – in the Icelandic
deCODE project. In this project, reference DNA was used to infer information
on 200,000 individuals that had never donated their own DNA [4].
5 A combinatorial approach
The statistical basis, and computational approach presented in [1] provides a
good basis for a much more complex attack.
Since a large chunk of phenotypic information is coming from social networks,
it is possible to gather additional information to create a better identity tracing
attack. This is discussed in the original paper, but can be taken a step further
depending on the size of the database that the adversary is working from.
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In the n = 10 case, attribute disclosure attacks (ADA) can be used. Since
it’s assumed a database of this size is gathered from actual samples, ADA can
be employed in parallel to phenotype prediction. This helps to increase the
accuracy of such an attack, by providing another method of identity tracing.
Completion attacks are also beneficial in this case, since environmental samples
may be significantly degraded [3], and inference might be necessary.
In the n = 80 case, completion attacks aid in increasing the power of the
supervised method. Initial attacks on smaller datasets can be confirmed (as in
the n = 10 case), which increases the size of the training set for the machine
learning portion of the attack. From here, additional genomes can be imputated,
and the training set can increase in size.
Relationship data gathered from social media, makes possible to build pedi-
gree charts of groups on individuals based on their familial relationships. This
means that once one individual has been identified, the search space for family
members becomes much smaller. This can be used in both a completion and an
identity tracing approach.
6 Countermeasures
Many current suggestions for protecting against a milieu of DNA de-anonymisation
attacks involve obscuring the DNA itself. Initially, it was suggested that the
genomes themselves be encrypted. While this is useful for an archival approach,
in many cases it increases the time to run certain analyses three-fold [4]. There-
fore, it is not acceptable for genetic research, and instead has a place in hospitals;
where large scale multi-dimensional genomic research is not undertaken [1].
Access control is another method that has been suggested [1, 4]. Currently,
this is a widely used approach by many groups. The main problem with this,
is that it slows down research due to the requirement to audit both data users,
and their methods. Making sure a verified user is not doing anything nefarious
with the data is still an open research area [4]. This form of defence also arises
if there is a social control in place. If researchers decide that sharing DNA
information in its current format is unethical, the solution to the problem falls
outside of patchwork jurisdictions and laws, and is instead embraced by the
scientific community as a larger whole.
Adding statistical noise to genomic data has also been proposed [1]. As
long as this does not impede work done on the data, it can be highly effective,
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and would only require a small amount of additional work to account for its
presence. The attack on such a defensive measure would be akin to rainbow
table on password salt. Whether an attack of this sort is feasible, depends
entirely on how such noise is implemented.
The idea of statistical noise is interesting, and can be explored in the context
of trait information. Where social network information is inaccurate can be seen
as cryptographic salt for phenotypes. This idea can be extended to databases,
so that phenotypic - or even metadata - contains salt, so that in the even of a
database breach, the data is unusable (as it becomes a red-herring).
Haircolour : Brown + Salt→ Black (5)
The problem with phenotypic salt is that incorrect trait information (such as
blood type), can wreak havoc in certain (i.e. medical) situations. Therefore,
this type of defence is only applicable to the database itself. Any end user needs
to see the correct (salt removed) information.
Countermeasures in genetic information need to be multifaceted in order to
deal with both multiple types of attacks, as well as multiple user types. Only
through the application of many measures will it be possible to keep genomic
information safe.
7 Conclusion
The initial work in [1] proved that the de-anonymisation of DNA was a real
threat. The expansion of this idea proves that it also realistic and completely
possible within the near future, if not right now, in certain cases. A large amount
of work still needs to be done to determine the full capabilities of such an attack.
However, once achieved, they will help inform the use of countermeasures – both
technological, and legal.
8 Acknowledgments
Firstly, I would like to thank Professor Clark Thomborson and Dr Rizwan As-
ghar for both their insight into system security, and assistance with the paper.
I would also like to thank Kathleen Seddon, whose editing prowess far exceeds
my own.
10
References
[1] M. Humbert, K. Huguenin, J. Hugonot, E. Ayday, and J.-P. Hubaux, “De-
anonymizing genomic databases using phenotypic traits,” Proceedings on
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, vol. 2015, no. 2, pp. 99–114, 2015.
[2] M. Gymrek, A. L. McGuire, D. Golan, E. Halperin, and Y. Erlich, “Identi-
fying personal genomes by surname inference,” Science, vol. 339, no. 6117,
pp. 321–324, 2013.
[3] M. Kayser and P. de Knijff, “Improving human forensics through advances
in genetics, genomics and molecular biology,” Nat Rev Genet, vol. 12, no. 3,
pp. 179–192, 2011. 10.1038/nrg2952.
[4] Y. Erlich and A. Narayanan, “Routes for breaching and protecting genetic
privacy,” Nature Reviews Genetics, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 409–421, 2014.
[5] L. Sweeney, A. Abu, and J. Winn, “Identifying participants in the per-
sonal genome project by name (a re-identification experiment),” CoRR,
vol. abs/1304.7605, 2013.
11
